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office that one's memory pictures "Hoh"; but in his class-room, there
behind the desk-in his class-room when some man had interposed a
question. There he sits, crouched somewhat forward on the desk;
his black-haired eagle-face seems set with anticipation of the clash of
views, his heavy shoulders tense, for all their student's stoop,--there
he sits, silent through several seconds. You too grow tense for the
struggle; but as you watch his eyes, you thrill with a dawning wonder,
almost awe-slowly, alone, you see him climbing up into the mountain,
to see this little question set out against the background of the whole,
to look again upon the body of the Law as one,--and signal down to
you the way to join him.
K.N.L.
BUILDERS' BONDS AND MATERIALMEN
In cases where a building contractor gives to the owner and obligee
a surety bond securing the performance of the builder's contract and
protecting the owner against the liens of laborers and materialmen,
there is a good deal of apparent conflict as to whether or not the
laborers and materialmen are beneficiaries of the contract and can
maintain suit against the bondsmen for sums due them from the con-
tractor. If they can sue at all, it is clear that they must sue as third-
party beneficiaries of a contract to which they themselves are not
parties. The question, on which the seeming conflict exists, is as to
whether or not they are in fact third-party beneficiaries.
In the recent case of Forburger Stone Co. v. Lion Bonding & Surety
Co. (1919, Neb.) 17o N. W. 897, the question was decided in favor
of the materialman, three judges dissenting. The facts seem to be
that the defendant surety company bound itself to the owner and
obligee to see that the building contractor should perform all of his
duties to the owner, one of these duties being that he should pay all
claims for labor and material. It was expressly provided in the bond
that the surety should be notified of any act on the part of the principal
that might involve loss to the surety, immediately upon knowledge of
such an act coming to the owner or his supervising architect. No
notice of this sort was ever given to the surety, and yet the court held
that the materialman could maintain suit.
The rule that a third-party beneficiary can enforce a contract made
for his benefit is too well established to need reaffirmation.' This is
true whether the third party is a donee2 or is a creditor of the promisee.3
See Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons (Tg18) 27 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, ioo8.
2Scaver v. Ransom (I918) 224 N. Y. 233, i20 N. E. 639; In re Edmundson s
Estate (1918) 259 Pa. 429, 1O3 At. 277.
'Lawrence v. Fox (I859) 20 N. Y. 268.
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COMMENTS
Even in England and in Massachusetts the supposed rule to the con-
trary. is greatly modified by exceptions and by relief in equity.' Hence
it is not necessary to determine in the present case whether the
materialman is a donee or a creditor of the obligee in the bond, except
for the purpose of determining whether or not he is a beneficiary at
all.
So far as appears, the obligee in the bond was the owner of the
premises, and such owner owed no debt to the materialman. The
building contractor did owe such a debt, but he is not the obligee.
Presumably the materialman had a statutory power to file a lien upon
the building and so the owner was under a correlative liability to have
his property rights greatly limited by such a lien; but this does not
mean that the owner owed any duty to the materialman or that the
latter was a creditor (or obligee) of the promisee. This fact does
show, however, that the owner had an interest of his own to protect
when he obtained a promise of the surety to see the materialman
satisfied. The existence of this interest in the obligee causes the case
to be governed by the rules applicable to creditor-benficiaries. 5 It
makes it certain that the materialman is not the sole beneficiary.
If the materialman is not the sole beneficiary, is there any reason for
holding that he is a beneficiary at all? It is believed that there is very
slight reason. A third party's right as a beneficiary may be based
upon one of two things: First, he may have the legal right, even
though he is not a promisee and gave no consideration, because the
contracting parties intended him to have such a right. Secondly, he
may be given such a right, even though the contracting parties did not
intend it, on the ground of general convenience and in order to avoid
circuity of action. It is upon the first that the rights of a cestui que
trust are based, as also are the rights of any sole third-party beneficiary.
It is upon the second that the rights of creditor-beneficiaries frequently
depend, although it is always quite possible for the contracting parties
to have the interests of the third party in mind and to intend him to
have a legally enforceable right.
In the case of a builder's bond do the contracting parties intend to
confer a legal right upon the materialman? In some instances there
are statutes expressly requiring such a bond for the benefit of laborers
'See (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoUmRAL, io26, and comment on The Collection of
Royalties from the Sub-Assignee of a Copyright (gIg) 28 ibid. 259.5Observe, however, that the agreed performance by the promisor will not be
the satisfaction of an obligation owed by the promisee to the beneficiary, a
requirement once insisted upon by the New York courts. Vrooman v. Turner
(1877) 69 N. Y. 28o; Durnherr v. Rau (x892) 135 N. Y. 219, 32 N. E. 49. It
will merely protect thepromisee from the exercise of the materialman's power
of filing a lien, terminating the promisee's 'liability to a damaging decrease in
his property rights.
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and materialmen.6 These, however, are no doubt all cases where the
obligee is the United States, a State, or a municipality, the statute
being passed because the mechanics' lien laws give to the laborer or
materialman no lien upon public buildings. If there is no such lien,
the obligee has no interest to protect; and if the materialman is men-
tioned in the bond at all, he must be a sole beneficiary and the obligee
must have intended him to have a legal right. Even where there is no
such statute and where the obligee has an interest to protect, the bond
may be so worded that the duty of the obligor to the obligee can be
fulfilled only by the obligor's making a payment direct to the third
party.' Such a wording is evidence of an intention to confer a legal
right upon the third party.
In the principal case there was no statute like that above mentioned,
the materialman had security by virtue of his power to file a lien, and
it does not appear that the wording of the bond required a payment
by the surety direct to the materialman. Under these circumstances
it requires a strong effort of the imagination to suppose that the owner
had any philanthropic intention of conferring a legal right upon the
materialman against the surety. It seems much more probable that he
took the bond solely for his own protection and that it was immaterial
to him what means the surety used to fulfil its duty to him.
8
Should the materialman be allowed to sue on the ground of general
convenience and to avoid circuity of action? No dogmatic answer
seems justified, but there are strong reasons for the negative. The
court should not compel the surety to pay the materialman, when there
were other ways in which the surety could perform its contractual
duty to the owner, and especially when, as here, such payment to the
materialman would not be a fulfillment of the surety's whole duty to
the obligee.9 To do so would force the surety to do more than his
contract required, while at the same time leaving him quite open to
another suit by the owner.
'Federal Statutes, 30 Stat. L. 9o6, ch. 218; 33 Stat. L. 811, ch. 778; Equitable
Surety Co. v. McMillan (1913) 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct. 803; Illinois Surety
Co. v. Davis Co. (1916) 244 U. S. 376, 37 Sup. Ct. 614; Calif. Code Civ. Proc.
sec. 1203; Carpenter v Furrey (1goo) 128 Calif. 665, 61 Pac. 369; Ind. Rev. St.
1881, secs. 4246, 4247.
7 Such was the case of Lawrence v. Fox, supra, where Fox promised Holly to
pay Holly's debt to Lawrence. See also Ochs v. Carnahan Co. (i9o8) 42 Ind.
App. 157, 8o N. E. 163.
"Standard Gas Power Corp. v. New England Casualty Co. (1917, N. J. Ct.
Err.) ioi AtI. 281, noted in (1917) 27 YArE LAw JOURNAL, 274; Lancaster v.
Frescoln (19o2) 2o3 Pa. 640, 53 Atl. 5o8; Parker v. Jeffery (1894) 26 Or. 186,
37 Pac. 712. See contra, Ochs v. Carnahan Co., supra.
"It must be admitted that the fact that the obligee will also have an action
against the surety for breach of contract is not in itself a sufficient reason for
denying an action to the materialman. But cf. National Bank v. Grand Lodge
(1878) 98 U. S. 123.
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COMMENTS
Even if all doubts as to whether the materialman is a beneficiary of
the contract should be resolved in favor .of the plaintiff (and in the
case of many surety bonds it may properly be so resolved), the decision
in the present case ought still to have been against him. His right was
in any case a conditional right, the condition being that notice of the
principal's default be given to the surety.10
It is said by the court that "the rights of laborers and materialmen
to be paid for their labor and material are 'fixed' when they have
faithfully performed the labor or furnished the material; and no
failure of the contractor thereafter can invalidate the rights so fixed."
Metaphorical language is always dangerous to exact reasoning; here
trouble lies in the use of the word "fixed." It conceals all distinctions
between a "power" and a "right" and between conditional rights and
unconditional rights. Suppose that A sells goods to B for a price
payable after B's ship comes in,"1 or after peace is declared, or in case
it rains before June i. The legal relations of A and B are "fixed" in
the sense that offer and acceptance are complete and rights exist. The
goods belong to B, and A has a conditional right to payment. Neither
party has a power of revocation. Yet A can maintain no suit until
another operative fact occurs, viz. the ship comes in, or peace is
declared, or rain before June. If the operative fact constituting the
condition is a voluntary act by A himself, he may be properly described
as having a power. In the present case, after a default by the principal,
the owner would have the power of creating a right in himself against
the surety by giving notice; and the right of the beneficiary, "fixed"
though it may be in the sense of irrevocable, is still conditional upon
notice being given. It is true that after a beneficiary acquires a right,
whether conditional or unconditional, the obligee cannot discharge it
by some subsequent act ;12 but the dissenting justice is quite right in
saying that the third party must take fhe contract as it was made: if it
" It does not appear that the words of the bond expressly describe notice as
a condition precedent to the duty of the surety. They may merely take the form
of an express promise by the owner and obligee to give such notice. While an
express promise is quite different from an express condition, it is very reason-
able in the present case to imply a condition-that is, to infer that the parties
intended that the fulfilment of the owner's promise to give notice should be a
condition precedent to the surety's duty to pay. Even if the defendant were
not a surety the inference from the words here used should be the same. We
do not need to rely upon the doctrine that a surety's contract is to be most
strictly construed in his favor. Of course, if the bond expressly described
notice as a condition, there is no room for inference or construction.
'See Gray v. Gardner (1821) 17 Mass. I88. See on the whole matter the
study by the present writer, supra, p. 739.
"West Duluth v. Norton (1894) 57 Minn. 72, 58 N. W. 829; School Dist. ex
rel. Koken Iron Works v. Livers (1899) 147 Mo. 58o, 49 S. W. 5o7; Doll v.
Crume (894) 4r Neb. 655, 59 N. W. 8o6; Equitable Surety Co. v. McMillan
(913) 234 U. S. 448, 34 Sup. Ct. 803.
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was without consideration he gets nothing; if it was voidable for
infancy, insanity, or fraud, it is voidable as against the third party ;'
if the contract is vitiated by mistake of fact the third party acquires
no right ;14 if the contract was illegal and void as to the promisee it is
no less so as to the third party;"5 and if the promisor's duty is
expressly or impliedly conditional the third party's correlative right is
likewise conditional. 8
There is no hardship whatever to the materialman involved in these
rules. He has given no consideration for the surety's promise. He
sold his goods in reliance upon the credit of the building contractor
and upon his statutory lien. If these have depreciated in value, this
was a risk he consciously assumed. If he has any right against the
surety on the bond, it comes to him "by a sort of unexpected grace."
If it is subject to some difficult condition, nothing is being taken from
him; his gift is merely of less value than it might have been. He
should not look his gift horse in the mouth. This is true even though
the plaintiff was clearly intended as a beneficiary. A fortiori is it
true if he is suing merely to avoid circuity of action by a sort of sub-
rogation to the right of the obligee against the defendant. It makes
absolutely no difference whether the third party is able to fulfil the
condition or not. The legal relations constituting the contract were
indeed "fixed" before he ever saw the document. He must take it as
he finds it.
A. L. C.
TAXATION OF CAR COMPANIES DOING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The drain on public finance, caused by the state's increasing partici-
pation in the social and industrial development of the present period,
has exerted a tremendous pressure on the states to discover new sources
of taxation. The vastly augmented amount of personalty, particularly,
has engaged the earnest attention of the tax gatherer. Particularly has
this gentleman's attention been directed to the property of foreign
"Arnold v. Nichols (1876) 64 N. Y. 117; Jenness v. Simpson (191o) 84 Vt.
127, 139, 78 AtI. 886; Cohn v. Kock (1iS8) 56 Ia. 658; Crowe v. Lewin (1884)
95 N. Y. 423; Dunning v. Leavitt (8i81) 85 N. Y. 30; Green v. Turner (1898,
C. C. E. D. Wis.) So Fed. 41.
" Crowe v'. Lewin (1884) 95 N. Y. 423; Stevens Inst. v. Sheridan (1878, Ch.)
30 N. J. Eq. 23; Rogers v. Castle (1892) 51 Minn. 428, 53 N. W. 651; Episcopal
Mission v. Brown (1894) 158 U. S. 22, 15 Sup. Ct 833.
"National Surety Co. v. Kansas City Brick Co. (igo6) 73 Kan. 196, 84 Pac.
1034-
" Jen-ness v. Simpson (igio) 84 Vt. 127, 143, 78 At. 886; Osborne v. Cabell
(883) 77 Va. 462.
'The late Professor W. N. Hohfeld referred to the ambiguity in the use of
the concept "property" in the following language: "A second reason for the
tendency to confuse or blend non-legal and legal conceptions consists in the
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